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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Lloyd Hardin McNeil appeals from the district court's Amended Order for 
Restitution and Judgment. On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when it 
overruled his objections to restitution for counseling sessions attended by the father of 
the victim, which he had attended before her death, and for the cost of a plane ticket for 
the adult brother of the victim to attend her funeral in California. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Following a jury trial at which Mr. McNeil was convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter in the death of Natalie Davis, arson in the first degree, and grand theft,1 
the State requested restitution for seven different individuals or entities, including 
Ms. Davis' father, Ken Davis. (39881 R.,2 pp.270-73.) Aside from raising an objection 
based on his inability to pay the total amount sought in light of the length of his 
sentence,3 Mr. McNeil did not object to restitution to six of the seven individuals or 
entities, and only objected to that portion of the restitution requested on behalf of Ken 
Davis in the State's amended restitution request.4 
1 The factual background of this case is set forth in greater detail in State v. McNeil, _ 
Idaho_ (Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2013), petition for rev. filed. 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the transcript and record prepared in 
an earlier appeal in this matter, and ordered the preparation of a limited clerk's record 
for this appeal. (R., p.2.) References to that record will be to "39881 R." References to 
the limited clerk's record prepared for this appeal will be to "R." 
3 Mr. McNeil does not pursue the denial of this basis for objection to the overall 
restitution on appeal. 
4 Of the $21,611.67 in restitution sought by the State in its Motion to Modify Restitution, 
Mr. McNeil only objected to the sum of $960.80. Reflecting Mr. McNeil's successful 
objections to its original request, the State reduced the amount it sought by over $7,000. 
(39881 R., pp.270-73, R., pp.28-29, Tr., p.13, Ls.18-24.) 
1 
Those amounts that Mr. McNeil challenged unsuccessfully were $300.80 for a 
plane ticket so that Ms. Davis' adult brother could attend her funeral in California and 
$660 for counseling sessions for Mr. Davis and his wife. (R., pp.22-23.) Pursuant to 
the State's Motion to Modify, the district court issued an Amended Order for Restitution 
and Judgment, reducing the total restitution amount to $21,611.67. (R., pp.32-33.) 
Mr. McNeil filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.34.) 
2 
ISSUE 




The District Court Erred When It Overruled Mr. McNeil's Objections To $960.80 Of The 
Restitution Award 
A. Introduction 
Mr. McNeil objected to a total of $960.80 of the more than $20,000 in restitution 
requested. He challenged the restitution for counseling sessions that began before 
Ms. Davis' death and for a plane ticket purchased on behalf of Ms. Davis' adult brother 
so he could attend her funeral in California. The objections to those two amounts were 
based on the fact that the counseling sessions were not attended as a direct result of 
Ms. Davis' death, as they were for a pre-existing condition, and that the plane ticket 
expense was not the direct result of the conduct underlying Mr. McNeil's voluntary 
manslaughter conviction. Mr. McNeil maintains that the district court erred when it 
assessed restitution for the two amounts that were not the direct result of the conduct 
for which he was convicted. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Overruled Mr. McNeil's Objections To $960.80 
Of The Restitution Award 
Idaho Code § 19-5304( 1 )( a) provides: 
"Economic loss" includes, but is not limited to, the value of the property 
taken, destroyed broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-
of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from 
the criminal conduct, but does not include less tangible damages such as 
pain and suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress. 
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) (emphasis added). "The restitution statute is not so broad ... as to 
authorize compensation for every expenditure that a victim may personally deem 
reasonable or necessary as a response to a crime." State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114 
(Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in original). 
4 
"Idaho Code Section 19-5304(6) provides that determination of economic loss is 
based upon the civil preponderance of evidence standard," and "the amount of the 
award must be supported by substantial evidence." In re Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 284 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). A trial "court's power to order restitution is limited to 
that provided by the statute." State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 887 (2013). 
In Card, the Court of Appeals considered whether a series of non-traditional 
health treatments following a minor car accident were subject to the restitution statute. 
In analyzing the issue, the Court of Appeals explained, "[l]t is evident that under the 
restitution statute, a crime must 'result' in an economic loss in order for restitution to be 
awarded," and that "where treatment expenses are sought, the State bears the initial 
burden to make a prima facie showing ... that the expenses were reasonable and 
necessary to treat injuries caused by the defendant's criminal conduct." Id. at 114-15 
(citing In re Doe). 
In Straub, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the restitution statute as applied 
to the immediate family of a homicide victim. In addressing the plain language of the 
restitution statute, the Court noted, "Medical expenses are expressly included in the 
definition for economic loss in I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) if they are a direct result of the 
criminal conduct." Straub, 153 Idaho at 890 (emphasis added). In reversing the award 
of restitution for medical insurance premiums paid to continue health insurance 
coverage for the immediate family of the victim following his death, the Court reasoned, 
"Although it is foreseeable that the death of the lone family breadwinner would leave the 
family without health insurance, foreseeability does not equal a 'direct' result." Id. 
5 
1. Counseling Sessions 
Like the medical insurance premiums in Straub, the counseling sessions 
attended by Mr. Davis were not the direct result of the crime for which Mr. McNeil was 
convicted. Defense counsel below objected to restitution for therapy costs, explaining, 
"According to the doctor's invoice, Mr. and Mrs. Davis began psychotherapy 
February 19, 2011, for treatment of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. However, Natalie 
Davis' murder [sic] did not occur until March 5, 2011." As such, the counseling was for 
"a pre-existing condition not associated with the death of Ms. Davis." (R., pp.22-23.) 
Because Mr. Davis had already been attending the counseling sessions prior to 
Ms. Davis' death for treatment of a pre-existing condition, he should not be able to 
recover restitution for that counseling unless the State can establish that the crime for 
which Mr. McNeil was convicted aggravated the condition for which Mr. Davis was 
already being treated. See Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 67 4 ( 1967) ("The trial court 
by its instruction No. 16 correctly advised the jury that respondent was entitled to 
recover damages for disability resulting from the aggravation of a pre-existing condition, 
but was not entitled to recover for any disability which respondent may now be suffering 
which was not caused or contributed to by reason of the accident."); see also IDJI 9.02 
(Aggravation of Pre-Existing Condition). 
Mr. McNeil asserts that continuing mental health counseling for the father of a 
homicide victim when that counseling started prior to the victim's death cannot, without 
more,5 be said to have been the "direct" result of the homicide. Even assuming that 
5 Had any evidence been presented that Ms. Davis' father was on the verge of 
completing a course of counseling when Ms. Davis was killed, causing a setback and 
necessitating additional sessions, this argument would not be well-taken. See State v. 
Behnke, 553 N.W.2d 265, 273 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (fact that sexual assault victim had 
previously completed mental health treatment due to earlier, unrelated sexual abuse did 
6 
some portion of the counseling sessions could be said, on the evidence in this record, to 
be the result of the aggravation of a preexisting condition, the district court did not 
delineate what portion is attributable to the crime for which Mr. McNeil was convicted. 
In light of the foregoing, Mr. McNeil asserts that the district court erred when it 
overruled his objection to restitution totaling $660 for counseling sessions that began 
before Ms. Davis' death. In the alternative, should this Court find that restitution for the 
continuation of counseling sessions after Ms. Davis' death was appropriate under the 
statute, Mr. McNeil maintains that the district court erred when it ordered $660 in 
restitution because $60 of that restitution was for one of the two sessions that preceded 
Ms. Davis' death.6 (R., p.22.) 
2. Funeral Travel 
Mr. McNeil also objected to the imposition of restitution "for the costs associated 
with flying Matthew Hess, Ms. Davis' brother, to California to attend Ms. Davis' memorial 
services." In so objecting, defense counsel argued, "This 'out-of-pocket' expense is not 
a direct loss Mr. Davis [who paid for the plane ticket] sustained as the result of 
Mr. McNeil's criminal behavior," and as such, the $300.80 awarded for the cost of the 
plane ticket purchased for Mr. Hess should not be awarded as restitution. (R., p.22.) 
No Idaho case law appears to exist on the question of whether the expense of an 
immediate family member of a homicide victim traveling to a funeral for that family 
member is something for which restitution can be awarded. The statutes governing the 
not necessitate reduction of restitution award on grounds of mental health issue being a 
pre-existing condition because the victim "prove[d] that Behnke's actions were a 
substantial factor in producing the injury that required treatment" and she was not 
required "to prove that the actions were the sole factor"). 
6 The district court has already disallowed restitution for one of the two sessions. 
(Tr., p.13, ls.18-19.) 
7 
Crime Victims Compensation Act contain the following reference to funeral expenses 
and transportation costs, "Reasonable funeral and burial or cremation expenses of the 
victim, together with actual expenses of transportation of the victim's body, shall be paid 
in an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars .... " I.C. § 72-1019(4) (emphasis 
added). 
Obviously, the Crime Victims Compensation Act is not the criminal restitution 
statute, but it provides insight into what the legislature, on the same subject, believes to 
be reasonably appropriate for a crime victim to receive for expenses related to a 
homicide. This intent is obvious from the Act's language, which includes the following, 
"[l]t is the legislature's intention to provide compensation for injuries suffered as a direct 
result of the criminal acts of other persons." I.C. § 72-1002 (emphasis added). The 
legislature used similar language in defining those economic losses for which criminal 
restitution is authorized, specifically noting that those expenses for which restitution may 
be ordered "include[], but [are] not limited to, the value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses . 
" I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
The use of the term "direct" in both statutes in reference to reimbursable 
expenses incurred, along with the identical subject matter of the two statutory schemes, 
supports Mr. McNeil's argument that the ambiguity in the restitution statute regarding 
transportation costs for immediate family members of homicide victims should be no 
greater than is allowed under the Crime Victims Compensation Act's provision. 
Furthermore, when considering an ambiguous criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires 
interpreting the statute in favor of the criminal defendant. See Hughey v. United States, 
495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990) (noting that the rule of lenity would apply to any ambiguities in 
8 
the federal criminal restitution statute). Finally, similar to the medical insurance 
premium issue in Straub, while it may foreseeable that an immediate family member 
would need to travel out-of-state in order to attend a homicide victim's funeral, such 
travel cannot be said to be the direct result of the homicide, as it is not necessary for a 
funeral to occur in another state nor is it necessary for all immediate family members to 
attend such a funeral. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. McNeil respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate that portion of the restitution order in which Mr. McNeil is ordered to pay for 
counseling sessions and a plane ticket for Ms. Davis' brother because those expenses 
were not the direct result of the conduct for which he was found guilty. In the 
alternative, if this Court finds that it does not have sufficient evidence from which to 
determine what portion of the counseling sessions were attributable to the conduct for 
which Mr. McNeil was convicted, he respectfully requests that the matter be remanded 
for a new hearing at which the district court can make such a determination. 
SPENCERJ.HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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